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Slander, Buzz and Spin: 
Telegrams, politics and global communications in the Uganda 
Protectorate, 1945–55 
Carol Summers 
Abstract 
Ugandans, from the earliest days of empire, did not simply receive information and messages from a distant 
Britain. Instead, with methods rooted in pre-colonial understandings of communications as establishing 
personal, affective, social closeness and reciprocities, they invested in education, travel and 
correspondence and built wide-ranging information and communications networks. Networked, they 
understood imperial institutions and pushed their own priorities via both official and unofficial channels. By 
the 1940s, political activists combined these information networks with the modern technologies of 
newspapers, telegrams and global press campaigns to destabilize colonial hierarchies. Generating 
slanderous allegations, repeating them to generate popular buzz, interpreting and constructing evidence 
through repetition and spin, Ugandan information activists shaped the politics of the 1940s and 1950s 
through lobbying. The formal, structural characteristics of Ugandans’ late colonial information activism help 
explain the failures of Britain’s post–World War II scientific, progressive, centrally planned initiatives for 
development and control. 
Preparing to inform all Ugandans of the end of World War II, colonial officials and chiefs planned a 
hybrid system of message transmission. District Commissioners would get telegrams, then send 
runners to mission stations. Missions would ring bells. Hearing bells, police stations would beat 
drums, and hearing the drums, people were to carry wood and make “really big” message bonfires on 
hills to spread the news everywhere. Thus, a peasant in rural Toro should experience ceasefire in 
Europe as she carried the wood to the hill for a bonfire to pass the message onward.1 
This model of information transfer, from the imperial center to hinterland through increasingly 
exotic and low-detail links, is exactly what students of empire have conventionally expected. 
Practices, though, were notably more complex. Ugandans in the late colonial era used information in 
intricate, targeted efforts toward political, economic, social and cultural change. In methods rooted in 
pre-colonial information technologies, such as slander and whispering campaigns, made modern 
through new technologies including newspapers and telegraphs, these activists from the geographical 
periphery of empire rejected metropolitan hierarchies of knowledge and control, and in doing so 
shaped buzzing publicity that spun new stories and sometimes destabilized imperial power. In the 
post-World War II era, Ugandans spun connections and acted on multidirectional webs of information 
whether or not the centrally planned imperial bonfires actually burned. 
In practice, communications linkages were not constrained to an orderly, unidirectional imperial 
hierarchy, transferring a simple message of victory from the imperial core to the far-flung hinterland. 
Uganda did have government-controlled newspapers, both in English (Uganda Herald) and Luganda 
(Matalisi), and by the late 1940s the information office had vehicles that could travel around the 
capital and countryside with loudspeakers proclaiming news and propaganda. But in the crises of the 
1940s and 1950s, Ugandans responded critically to such information initiatives, to the point that a 
Luganda newspaper summarized how, in 1953, “the people have told the mobile news vans to go 
away,” turned off radios broadcasting official news, and regarded official leaflets as “disgusting.”2 
Unwilling simply to accept the words of colonial Information Office, a wide variety of Ugandans 
mobilized information networks in different directions, competitively passing information among 
Ugandans, and reaching up and across imperial hierarchies of mission, state and beyond. Publicists 
of today’s ongoing information revolution may see networking, virtual community-building and the 
manipulation of public opinion as new phenomena, but they have a history.3 Both Ugandans and 
colonial officials in the 1940s and 1950s used telegrams, newspapers, loudspeakers and propaganda 
shows to enhance older styles of communication, building wide-ranging communities and shaping 
both local and transnational public opinion.4 
Colonial rule in Uganda drew on a complex cultural past in which Ugandans negotiated power 
through information, messages, rumor, gossip, slander, connections and carefully maintained polite 
and powerful associations. New technologies did not, despite what Colonial Office officials sometimes 
intended, allow London to advise Ugandans into a generic pattern of development or progressive 
change. Instead, what emerged was a local “conversation with colonial modernity.”5 Ugandans 
blocked or re-made plans that interfered with local priorities. The initiatives and technologies that 
British agents facilitated, such as postal services, printing presses, bicycles, wireless, films and 
telegrams all became additional resources, rather than substitutes, for Ugandans’ efforts at 
engineering personal connections and the wealth and power those connections could bring. 
Ugandans who understood information and connections as opportunities to achieve wealth and 
power, enthusiastically embraced new systems of communication and information. The story of 
literacy in Uganda has been discussed elsewhere.6 Here, I focus on telegrams, press campaigns and 
political provocation in the 1940s and 1950s. In Uganda, documents from this period demonstrate 
Ugandans’ creative use of both private and public information. By the 1950s, Ugandan information 
entrepreneurs may even have taught local British officials advanced forms of local information 
manipulation and networking that those officials came to wield in their associations with London-
based offices and leaders of the Church of England, the Colonial Office and Parliament.7 
Knowledge, Information and Power 
Studying “intelligence,” scholars have suggested that the new imperialism of the twentieth century 
was rooted in spying and the social sciences, along with more conventional economic and military 
might, rather than a reductionist orientalism.8 Knowledge of the colonial context, they suggest, 
became potentially powerful not through heroic stories of individuals, however peculiar, but as part of 
relationships and institutions that made observations useful. Students of anthropology’s history have 
increasingly understood anthropology and empire as mutually constitutive, and shaped not simply by 
colonial planners, but also by African informants, interpreters, and intermediaries who made the 
hinterland intelligible to the imperial core.9 Historians of science, too, have emphasized how scientific 
knowledge in reality is routinely created through networking and collaborative communities, rather 
than through individual discovery. Whether writing about the growth of botanical knowledge in the 
nineteenth century, or about the science behind the Green Revolution in the twentieth century, they 
emphasize metropolitan scientists’ ability to pull together knowledge from around the world, order and 
systematize it, and then shape it for re-export.10 Thus science, like governance, has required complex 
systems of correspondence between center and hinterland in a metropolitan hierarchy usually seen 
as centered in Europe (especially Britain). Imperial metropolitan institutions have used this status as 
the nexus of powerful and expert communications and knowledge to both move forward technically, 
and to plan technical, scientific or political progress. Few have questioned the primacy of imperial 
centers as the places where officials, scientists, and experts draw on their privileged access to 
cultural and political intelligence and scientific resources to make key decisions shaping imperial 
governance. 
Ugandans’ correspondence, though, rejected such metropolitan hierarchies. Instead, Ugandans 
had a history of writing and telegramming to London with intensity and sophistication and in pursuit of 
their own agendas. They built their own corresponding networks and relationships with varied groups 
of British associates rather than relying on the Colonial Office. Relationships rooted in half a century 
of personal exchanges, letters and occasional voyages were sustained and intensified not simply by 
letters and reports, but by telegrams that emphasized the significance (and wealth) of the senders 
and the close connectedness of senders and recipients. Telegrams were more than simply their 
content. Uganda’s notables sent bags of them to congratulate Britain on its victory in the Second 
World War.11 Detainees sent them to mission patrons to protest detention and deportation without trial 
in the aftermath of political upheaval.12 Activists used them to demand their own meetings with high-
ranking visitors to Uganda and Colonial Office personnel.13 And telegrams, read aloud to crowds, 
became part of mass politics from the late 1940s onwards. Ugandan groups also collected funds to 
send telegrams to London and the United Nations in New York, using their money to seek access to 
international discussions. These went so far beyond the older petitions characteristic of the 1920s 
that Colonial Office authorities in London explicitly acknowledged a new type of engagement with 
public opinion, noting “we must… get a little away from the old way of replying…. I don't think a brief 
reply is enough. ‘What and why’ must be given to the African if we expect him to 
understand.”14 Telegrams were so valuable in establishing routine connections of patronage, shared 
responsibility and security that by the 1950s, the Colonial Office in London, inundated not simply with 
telegrams from Ugandans but also communications from Protectorate officials marked “urgent,” 
chided officials in Entebbe and asked for less demanding connections. 
Both Ugandans, and increasingly their British Protectorate administrators, participated actively in 
making a routinely networked and corresponding imperial world. Ugandans’ goals, though, were not 
to educate British analysts or construct a normative and progressive empire of bilateral exchanges 
centered in London. Instead, they shaped an interlocking network that deployed routine polite 
exchanges to establish intercontinental social communities of obligation and affect. In both routine 
and exceptional communication, Ugandans' information—fictional, spun or accurate—built influence 
within the empire and beyond. 
Beginning in the mid 1940s, telegrams were part of a technologically transformed web of 
relationships that reshaped what it meant to be a British Protectorate. Their senders, censors, 
recipients, translators, funders and prosecutors came to see communications networks as offering not 
metropolitan direction, but a significant affective closeness between Uganda and Britain. Their 
significance was less the speed with which they could transmit factual information between Entebbe 
and London than the social cachet that they brought, and the ability of those with access to this 
technology to jump the queue of petitioners and be decoded (sometimes literally) and attended to, 
whether they were British or Ugandan. In the 1940s, activists built on this foundation of routine 
messages, adding content that shaped the relationships messages established, and that moved from 
slander to evidence through repetition and transmission. 
During political mobilization in late colonial Uganda, activists and administrators developed and 
deployed informational networks. The dense sources that record the relationships of the period raise 
comparative questions about empire, and particularly about lobbying. In the Ugandan case, 
Ugandans managed to effectively lobby Britain, mobilizing a startlingly diverse British public for 
Ugandan goals and against the Colonial Office and its parliamentary leadership.15 Instead of 
delineating empire as a powerful metropole resisted and accommodated by its exploited hinterland, 
the informational networks produced and manipulated by a range of actors linked political, social and 
economic entrepreneurs in complicated, asymmetrical ways, with relationships that individuals and 
groups manipulated. 
Background 
Uganda is about 1,500 km by land from the nearest ocean port, but from the nineteenth century 
onward, British imperialists agreed with the Kingdom of Buganda’s leaders that the country was not 
remote. From early interactions onward, Buganda’s reputation was as a place where usual imperial 
frictions of incomprehension, exotic politics and poverty were minor. In the 1870s the court of King 
Mutesa I hosted Muslim traders and recruited missionaries from Britain and France, encouraging 
literacy and technologies, and establishing a relatively modern postal system. By 1879, British 
planners already sought a telegraph line down the Nile to Mutesa’s court, from whence additional 
lines could be built to locations in the interior.16 By the early twentieth century, Uganda emerged as a 
model protectorate. Observers touted it with publicity slogans used to this day.17 In 1907, George 
Wilson, the protectorate’s Deputy Commissioner who had first arrived in 1894, was able to portray the 
region as one with impressive material and human infrastructure. He emphasized dignified clothed 
people and literate bureaucrats, “enterprising and willing” in coordinating development and capable 
as well of producing cotton and buying imports. Ugandans moved quickly to adapt techniques and 
ideas, such as literacy and Christianity, and products, drinking imported tea and abandoning bark 
cloth clothing for “Arab style” cottons cleaned with imported laundry blue.18 
Like others, Wilson praised such modernizing development. He also foregrounded new 
communication technologies, celebrating as the telegraph line through the Sudan neared completion, 
and as the Uganda railway shortened the journey to the coast from a grueling multi-month walk to a 
four day train ride. Quick accessible connections were foundational to imperial progress and control.19 
The Ugandans that Wilson encountered had a history of considering close connections as 
foundations of both personal and collective success. Holly Hanson’s history of Buganda emphasized 
local politics and economics as rooted in intimately performed reciprocal obligation, where power 
emerged from being close to the powerful, rather than from more abstract or economic 
qualifications.20 With such advanced networking skills, Ugandan elites responded to Britons by 
seeking to learn and connect. They sent their children and wards to schools.21 Eminent men even 
travelled to Britain to ensure a personal impression on not just young District officers or missionaries 
in Uganda, but on Queen Victoria, Parliament, industry, church, and press that they viewed as 
important to Uganda’s future.22 Such connections contributed to a successful colonial Uganda as elite 
Ugandans and Britons working together established Buganda-style administrative structures 
throughout the protectorate, transformed agriculture to feature cotton and coffee cash crops, and 
supported local schools, development and administration.23 Ugandan styles of networking worked 
effectively on a British elite held together through its own strategies of schooling, clubs, associations 
and expectations.24 
Over several decades, protocols developed with regard to messages. Ugandans channeled 
telegrams of condolence and congratulation to Britain’s leadership via the governor of Uganda and 
the Colonial Office. Likewise, the King of Britain officially responded through the appropriate channels 
of Colonial Office, governor, and protectorate administration. These messages offered little content. 
But conveyed in telegrams that signaled significance, they reinforced the relationship between all 
parties to the message.25 
From Rumor and Association to “New” Information Technologies and the 
Public Sphere 
By the 1940s, though, both in the context of World War II and after, Ugandan elite networks grew and 
Britain lost its status as the imperial center, diminished by war and austerity.26 Ugandans, whether 
cotton growers, military recruiters or veteran soldiers, understood the war—especially its mobilization, 
informational, and technological aspects—as their initiation into modernity.27 Having won, they 
expected rewards, and complained vigorously when, for example, Ugandan servicemen failed to 
receive booty and reparations.28 Thoughtful observers in Uganda were proud of victory but they saw 
that victory as their own, rather than as a sign of imperial power. 
British officials, stretched thin by military drafts, understood the fragility of British administration. 
Historian Gardner Thompson argued that Britain all but lost control of Buganda, Uganda’s central and 
wealthiest province, during the war. A wartime propaganda expert proud of his shows conveyed the 
tense atmosphere to his correspondent by noting a profound lack of loyalty toward Britain and that 
“almost every DC expressed anxiety…. There was something unpleasantly sinister in the way 
Administrative Officers would frankly urge us to fire our weapons so that Africans might appreciate 
the futility of arguing with Bren guns.”29 
The late 1940s and early 1950s, therefore, as British officials sought to re-engage with economic, 
social and political development, were years of conflict.30 Government planners stopped describing 
Ugandans as progressive leaders and dismissed them as backward, with Governor Sir John Hall 
asserting “the Africans of Uganda are indolent, ignorant, irresponsible and not infrequently suspicious 
of foreign intervention.”31 
Within this context, the 1945 general strike, as both an economic effort to gain access to war 
bonuses and a political assault against a system of administration by corrupt chiefs, was also a 
struggle over information and interpretation. It set a pattern of informational and interpretive struggle 
that persisted at least into the 1950s. The general strike was followed by the assassination of 
Buganda’s prime minister, Martin Luther Nsibirwa, in September 1945 with subsequent detentions. 
After the strike, political mobilization intensified, led by the Cotton Growers’ Association and the 
Bataka Union. Aggressive, provocative lobbyists (Ignatius Musazi and Semakula Mulumba, 
respectively) spoke for both organizations, extending their reach beyond popular mobilization in 
Uganda. Musazi and Mulumba worked in London and spoke directly with British activists, religious 
leaders, businesspeople, development experts, metropolitan Colonial Office and Labour politicians, 
diplomats and journalists. Their campaign was central to the popular politics that coordinated the 
1949 uprising. 
The activism and unrest of the late 1940s involved strikes and violence, but it was most innovative 
in its use of communications. Prior to the 1945 uprising, Ugandans had circulated and sold 
pamphlets, particularly the banned pamphlet Buganda Nyaffe—inflammatory propaganda that 
accused local chiefs of acting as the loyal dogs of Britain in selling off Buganda’s land and 
transforming its people to slaves.32 Local printing presses, initially associated with missions, had 
expanded in the early twentieth century, becoming available not just for devotional materials, but for 
the explicitly political. This included Luganda language pamphlets and newspapers that could express 
views of individuals or groups.33 These were sold to government spies, but also to Ugandans who 
read them in Kampala and Masaka, and sent them further afield via bus routes to rural locations 
where literate traders or sons of chiefs would read them to broader audiences. By the mid 1940s, at 
least some Ugandans had come to define spreading information from newspapers—not simply 
government propaganda—as one of the duties of a good chief, as opposed to one that simply worked 
for the British.34 
When they struck in 1945, Ugandan activists targeted the telephones and telegraph connecting 
Entebbe with outlying areas, stopped the trains and set up roadblocks, seizing lorries and blocking 
police and military transit, as well as halting bus traffic. They even attacked the printing presses of 
the Uganda Herald, the government-friendly English language local paper of record.35 The British 
commissioner who investigated the unrest noted that informed planning had shaped events: a 
suspicious number of chiefs (including the young king himself) were absent from their posts at the 
time. Tactics centered on breaking the communication systems that facilitated Protectorate control. 
The commissioner acknowledged that the “Government and police were taken completely by 
surprise.” 
The commissioner’s suggested reform measures emphasized the need for closeness and 
connections between administration and Ugandans. He called for reforms of Uganda’s intelligence 
and Special Branch activities, supported a new Public Relations office, and advocated a series of 
precautions, including a private telegraph line between Kampala and Entebbe and plans for guards 
on infrastructure “vital points.”36 
Strike leaders and those officials accused of organizing the prime minister’s assassination ended 
up in detention. But from their remote locations they nevertheless managed protests that reconnected 
them with a broader political world: they wrote careful and well-informed legal briefs against detention 
without trial that were hand copied in school notebooks and sent to potential readers and patrons, 
ranging from missionaries and church officials to the Colonial Office. The government’s case against 
the alleged assassin, appealed to Britain’s Privy Council in a volume replete with red seals and formal 
paperwork, also indicated continued older forms of information and paperwork, particularly as it 
culminated in a hanging.37 
By 1946, though, after such contests over information and interpretation, Ugandan activists 
mobilized through modern associations.38 These newer associations, particularly the Bataka Union 
(BU), worked through informational and communications tactics rooted in Ugandan tradition, but they 
also deployed new technologies for print, travel, and communications. They began with a “whispering 
campaign,” to spread strategic rumors.39 Over time, rumors created their own reality. Specific 
economic grievances did not lead to unrest until “nothing more tangible than the fairy-tales of the 
agitators” played on “gullibility” and “suspicion” coordinated through rumor, sometimes provoking 
dramatic consequences.40 Rumors could be both repeated and explained in vernacular pamphlets, 
posters and newspapers. By discussing rumors, rather than stating observations, activists may have 
sought to avoid increasingly energetic protectorate prosecutions for slander and libel.41 And in the 
aftermath of 1945’s upheaval, Ugandan political activists intensified efforts to shape reality through 
oral and printed materials, both in Buganda and beyond, venturing into new genres of open letters, 
telegrams and lobbying, all well represented and reported on in vernacular newspapers. 
These efforts coalesced in 1948–49. During these years, Semakula Mulumba, the Bataka Union’s 
London lobbyist,42 was one of the most energetic practitioners of this sort of inflammatory 
informational politics. Building on generations of expectations around routine communications, he 
acted through available technologies of information, from open letters, pamphlets and vernacular 
newspapers to strategic telegrams. Mulumba understood the manners of petitioning. He initially used 
these manners, portraying himself as a humble grandson sent to London by grandparents seeking to 
save Buganda. He also, though, nearly simultaneously, tactically violated convention with disruptively 
vulgar language in provocative slanders. In telegrams, letters, pamphlets and speeches, he provoked 
and then skewered British hypocrisies, denouncing the many bases of colonial control, including 
treaties, aristocratic relationships and missions, and not excluding individual greed, sin and 
maliciousness. Though occasionally condemned as a communist, Mulumba’s approach was far from 
scientific Marxism. His style mixed Ganda-style personal slander with Catholic Action–style moralizing 
diagnosis and call to action.43 
Mulumba proved gifted at amplification, the transformation of a dull message into vitriol: 
“HELL HALL BILLS DISPLAY HIS [Governor Hall’s] STUPIDITY AND IDIOCY…. THE PROGRESSIVE BATAKA 
ELDERS HAVE MADE HIM FEEL THE NEED OF HARSH LEGISLATION TO CRUSH DEMOCRACY… TO PRESERVE 
IDIOTIC QUISLINGS…. GOVERNOR HALL IS A WILD DOG LONGING FOR BLACK BLOOD.” This particular 
telegram to Kampala’s police commissioner went on to connect campaigns against activists’ 
detention, Bishop Stuart’s signing over mineral rights on mission lands, and older grievances over the 
1900 Uganda Agreement. It also condemned Uganda’s legal system, asserting “THE ENGLISH JUDGES 
IN UGANDA HAVE NO JUSTICE FOR THE BLACK PEOPLE: YOU... DESERVE JAIL SHOOTING THE ATOMIC BOMB 
THE GALLOWS THE GUILLOTINE.” The telegram paired this denunciation of the powerful with an assertion 
that state coercion had its limits: 
WE SCORN YOU LIKE THE DROPPINGS IN A PRIVY; RAGE, YOU ENGLISH THIEVES, WHITE SWINE, BURST IF YOU 
WANT; EVEN IF YOU WERE TO KILL ME A THOUSAND TIMES I SHOULD REVIVE, REJOICING, AND TELL YOU TOO THAT 
YOU ENGLISH ARE LIARS, THIEVES, DRUNKARDS, IDLERS, WHO DRAIN AWAY THE MONEY OF THE BLACK FOLK. 
YOUR HEART IS AS HARD AS THE HIDE OF A HIPPOPOTAMUS; GO AND BE HANGED.44 
Mulumba’s original, presumably in Luganda, was transmitted from London, addressed to Kampala’s 
police commissioner with copies to the United Nations, prime minister [of the UK], colonial secretary, 
governor, office of the king of Buganda, the Bataka Union, and the Uganda press. The Luganda 
message provided a text that could be read defiantly in public meetings. Luganda newspapers printed 
excerpts. These attacks were not simply about general issues of nationalism or exploitation. They 
were personally vicious. Such publicity threatened Uganda-based officials’ quiet cooperation with 
Britain. Translated into English, telegrams did additional work as police and intelligence employees 
recorded, discussed and interpreted their provocations within the Protectorate and to the Colonial 
Office. Vigorous language got picked up in international reports, potentially reaching as far as the 
United Nations. Reprinted in pamphlets and circulated within Uganda, allegations provoked slander 
suits and new press restrictions and the Bataka Union emerged as a martyr for free speech, able to 
discuss its allegations in court. 
The specific allusions of the telegram—invoking both atomic bombs and hippopotamus hide—
vividly linked modern cosmopolitan images and local understandings. In noting British insensitivity—
heart of hippopotamus hide—Mulumba denounced British “justice” and colonial development 
initiatives. And thus rather than exemplifying progressivism, the governor’s actions, he suggested, 
earned consequences ranging from the conventional shooting to the very modern atomic bomb. 
Attacking British claims to moral superiority, Mulumba positioned himself as the hero of human rights, 
speaking even if “killed a thousand times.” This message of moral inversions was not subtle. 
Nor was the “Hell Hall” telegram an isolated occurrence. Beginning in 1948, and continuing 
through the 1949 uprising, Mulumba sent dozens of telegrams. He copied (cc’ed) them strategically. 
And he used short telegrams to draw attention to longer denunciations. By August of 1948, he and 
Bataka Union activists in Uganda had sent enough telegrams of accusation that he was able to quote 
them in subsequent letters as evidence for his allegations of British abuse. Mulumba was a thoughtful 
reader of treaties and government papers. But he did not write about bluebooks or development 
reports. He failed to construct any sort of statistical or economic analysis of British exploitation. 
Instead, he made melodramatic accusations of treachery and corruption. 
Once sent as telegrams, however, Bataka statements (or, more precisely, slanders) about British 
motives became the evidence Mulumba rested on in vivid demands for investigation. An eight-page 
analytic letter to Andrei Gromyko denounced British initiatives for local councils and Closer Union, 
and asked for the United Nations to intervene to “demand Britain’s account of her stewardship” over 
the colonized peoples “under British economic, social and political tyranny” and unable to protest 
without being silenced by colonial sedition and deportation ordinances. “The Africans are a young 
nation acting under forces of progress…. Britain is dead weight…. She has aged so much that she 
can only think of progress in terms of centuries.” Mulumba went on to ask “Why does the British 
Government deliberately ‘keep the black man down?’” before answering his own question with 
“Owing to her decrepitude and morbidity, Britain is a clog on the fast wheel of African competition, 
efficiency and general progress.” A copy of a single telegram, from the Bataka activists of Busoga, 
was the letter’s sole evidence of British motivations. It read “SENIOR CHIEFS INTENTIONALLY 
THREATENED AND COMPELLED CENTRAL COUNCIL MEMBERS VOTE AGAINST PUBLIC OPINION.”45 
Mulumba wrote to those he disapproved of. Some letters, like one sent to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury on the eve of the Lambeth Conference, were long denunciations.46 Others were shorter 
telegrams probing for reactions. Buganda’s prime minister [Katikkiro] reported two sinister telegrams 
in July, copied as usual to governor, police and press. The first said: “REMEMBER YOUR FATHER APOLO 
WAS A MUSOGA. [He] SOLD UGANDAAGREEMENT NOW YOU AND YOUR FELLOW MEN CANNOT MANAGE THE 
DEAD AND GOD WILL PLEASE BE WISE.”47 A second telegram late the following day asked: “WHO ARE 
THOSE WHO WANT TO ARREST AND MURDER THE BATAKA, CHIEFS OR INDIANS. REQUEST GOVERNOR 
AND POLICE WHO ARE GUIDING THE PROTECTORATE.”48 While murky, these notes rejected the Katikkiro’s 
legitimacy as a ruler, reminded him of his vulnerability (his predecessor had been assassinated) and 
emphasized that he was incurring blame without obtaining any independent power. And by circulating 
multiple copies, or at least implying that the document was public, Mulumba attacked the Katikkiro’s 
prestige and enhanced that of the Bataka Union, which Mulumba described elsewhere as a fierce lion 
prepared to take down colonial rule. An open telegram in Luganda went further, addressing “all 
people of Uganda” and asserting: 
THE BRITISH WITH THE ARMY HAVE, INDEED, SHOWN THEMSELVES OUR ENEMIES… FROM KINGS OF UGANDA 
DOWN TO PEASANTS, ANYONE NOT RECOMMENDING THE BREAKING OF ALL AGREEMENTS OF UGANDA IS AN ENEMY 
TO THE NATION… I HAVE, ON BEHALF OF UGANDA PEOPLE, ANNOUNCED YOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER 
OF ENGLAND AND TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES. ALL AGREEMENTS WILL BE BROKEN SO 
THAT WE MAY BE SAVED FROM THE BRITISH FOREIGNERS.49 
Asserting that copies were being sent to Britain’s prime minister and colonial secretary, as well as 
Uganda’s governor and Buganda’s king, Mulumba sought to make Uganda’s rejection of British rule 
into a fact supported by a paper trail. This strategy—and the significance of the high tech whispering 
campaign—became clear in a telegram later in August that condemned arrests of Bataka leaders in 
Uganda and told officials: 
YOU ARE BEING COMPLETELY FOOLISH AND CHILDISH… YOU THIEVES DESERVE TO BE SHOT AND TO BE 
IMPRISONED…. THE STUART LETTERS I HAVE ALREADY PUBLISHED TO THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT 30 COPIES OF 
THEM. I HAVE CLEARED THE AIR COMPLETELY THE SECRET LETTERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO MISSIONARIES 
AND IF YOU DEVILS WANT TO GET HOME LEAVE AND EAT YORKSHIRE PUDDING AND SMELL PICCADILLY IT WOULD 
BE BETTER FOR YOU TO LEAVE US AND OUR PROPERTY.50 
In August, 1948, the British-allied leadership of Buganda [Uganda’s central kingdom] publically 
appealed to the British Resident [in English], asserting that “Mr. Semakula Mulumba… does not 
represent the Buganda Government and this meeting therefore requests the Protectorate 
Government to have the said Semakula Mulumba prosecuted for passing on false and dangerous 
information to the people of Buganda with the intention of creating disorder in the country.”51 With this 
appeal, though, Buganda’s chiefs became even more clearly associated with Britain, and Britain with 
the suppression of information and the transformation of Ugandans into something less than citizens. 
Mulumba’s responses became if anything blunter, with a long telegram telling Uganda’s people to 
“FROWN ON THE CHIEFS THEY HAVE LET THEMSELVES IN FOR IT PROPERLY, PREPARE YOUR COUP-DE-GRACE” 
before sarcastically going on to say “BRAVO” to Protectorate officials “BETRAYING BAGANDA CHIEFS 
QUISLINGS TO PEOPLE BY PUBLISHING SECRET RESOLUTION” and asserting that Bishop “STUART IS 
RETURNING TO ROB US FURTHER ALSO YOU BRITISH AND THE GOVERNOR ARE THIEVES.” The telegram 
concluded, rather terrifyingly, with “IF ALL OF US MUST DIE BRAVELY HOW CAN THEY TAKE OUR 
MOTHER UGANDA OBJECT TO BRITAIN ITSELF.”52 
Having worked to shape a crisis, Mulumba used telegrams to put other personal attacks on record. 
He accused Governor Hall of “losing it” and needing home leave, informed the Colonial Secretary that 
the administration discredited Britain and, possibly in response to Uganda Protectorate efforts to 
enlist Britain’s special branch to investigate Mulumba’s personal life, telegrammed Uganda’s Chief 
Secretary, “LEAVE BATAKA ALONE YOU NEVER BEEN MONK I KNOW MISSIONARIES AND CAN WRITE STILL 
THICKER MATERIAL IF YOU CHALLENGE…” before warning against some “EFFEMINATE DODGE.”53 
Mulumba continued to push toward a confrontation that would polarize the situation. In late 1948, 
he telegrammed directly, “UGANDA PEOPLE COMPLAIN BUGANDA CHIEFS PLOT EXILE KABAKA ASSASSINATE 
LEADING BATAKA DEPORT REST GOVERNOR BISHOP INVOLVED.”54 This telegram was loaded with 
keywords—chiefs plotting, Kabaka [king] exiled, planned assassinations and detentions, and it 
implicated the Governor and Bishop. The telegram was believable. Sent in English, it would have 
been read and recorded in multiple copies in Uganda and beyond. Even more dramatically, it 
sketched a strategy for an immoral, unprincipled colonial response—the Protectorate government 
could indeed understand Bataka mobilization as people complaining, chiefs plotting, the Kabaka 
being unhelpful, and assassination as a basic tool. British and Christian hegemony, rooted in claims 
of civilizational ideals and maturity, were explicitly under threat if the Protectorate administration 
responded to Mulumba’s predictions as he expected them to, and as he called on outside observers 
to witness.55 
Protectorate officials kept files, took notes, translated, and tried to dissuade London-based 
audiences from listening or conversing with Mulumba, Musazi or other Bataka-related activists. They 
encouraged local notables to sue for slander. But in doing so, they appeared petty, and effectively in 
propaganda terms became the tyrants Mulumba accused them of being. By September 1948, they 
had provoked investigations from a London-based reporter, who travelled to Uganda, had coffee with 
the governor and attorney general, and met local newspaper publishers as he assessed the 
Protectorate’s actions in “muzzling the voice of the people.”56 
In April 1949, culminating over a year of intense whispering and organizing, the Bataka Union 
coordinated a march on the Kabaka’s palace in what became an armed uprising against Buganda 
Government officials (not against British rule) that seized vehicles, destroyed government property 
and resulted in some deaths and thousands of arrests. To date, no report on events has fully 
explained what happened or why. But key to the insurrection was the use of inflammatory telegrams 
and press not only in the whipping up of rebellion but also in spinning how outsiders interpreted the 
actions. Government officials sought to label the events of 1949 as simple “riots.” Mulumba referred 
to them as “revolution” and “war.”57 And even more dramatically, Mulumba made sure that news of 
Ugandan casualties reached the international press, regardless of whether Ugandans had actually 
been killed in the reported numbers. The Daily Worker and the New Africa both repeated Mulumba’s 
allegations of “TERROR in UGANDA” with assertions of 13,000 arrested, hundreds killed, and 
systematic torture of detainees.58 
The aftermath of the uprising included a botched government investigation (the original 
commissioner went mad) and numerous trials in Native Government courts that lacked the 
protections of habeas corpus and British ideas of the burden of proof. Faced with a potential public 
relations disaster, British officials from the colonial secretary on down sought to minimize the event, 
transform it from “war” or “revolution” into a petty factional fight against the king, emphasizing that it 
was not relevant to British rule. To do this, they collected and then hid documents from activists 
across Uganda and selectively built chronologies and reports for the official record.59 
The legacy of 1949, though, was suggestive: information-gathering and propaganda were explicitly 
noted as essential government activities in the wake of the uprising, and the Colonial Office expanded 
initiatives toward the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere University, which was to 
become a center for careful collection and interpretation of rumor, intelligence and public opinion.60 
British Learning and Informational Networks 
In the Protectorate’s early years, Ugandans manipulated their relationships with British officials and 
institutions via careful use of both rumor and the technologies of communication. British officials were 
disturbed and provoked by Semakula Mulumba and the Bataka Union’s whispering campaign not 
simply because it raised real issues about chiefly authority, cotton prices and provincial development 
initiatives, but especially because they had been so thoroughly blindsided by both the 1945 general 
strike and the Nsibirwa assassination. In the aftermath of these events, they had instituted new 
procedures to ensure the collection of information about local activists, and to try to prepare for their 
prosecution. The problem was that the official colonial legal system did not serve their efforts to deal 
with real unrest, and they thus found it more convenient to hand over “justice” to the highly 
problematic courts of the Kingdom of Buganda. And as they relied on Ugandan allies, their position 
became tenuous and it sometimes was unclear who was the senior or more capable partner in these 
alliances. At times, officials seem to have mistrusted their allies among office-holding Ugandans as 
much as they distrusted the Bataka Union. By 1951, the British Resident in Buganda was writing 
plaintively to the chief secretary asking permission to prosecute for criminal libel an activist who had 
written and published petitions denouncing Buganda’s prime minister. The Attorney General, though, 
asserted that “we do not prosecute persons in respect of petitions to the Governor” as “they are 
entitled to say what they like to him,” accepting denunciations and disrespectful writing as part of the 
reality of governance.61 Desperate for information, and aware of their own vulnerability, officials found 
themselves sponsoring dubious prosecutions for slander and sedition. Such efforts appeared lame in 
the context of Uganda’s intensive information environment. 
By 1949, officials had realized that their problem was serious, and could not be solved simply with 
usual administrative practices. While floundering in response to Mulumba and the Bataka’s 1940s 
maneuvers, they began to learn, developing more efficient systems of information and propaganda 
and seeking to shape public opinion not just within Uganda but also in Britain. This did not solve their 
problems. Even in the conflicts of the 1950s, Ugandans’ propaganda initiatives outclassed those of 
Great Britain, ultimately resulting in an embarrassing about-face by British officials who accepted 
Ugandans’ rewriting of the Uganda Agreement and the return of Buganda’s king in the 1950s despite 
earlier assertions that such a thing would be impossible. 
Conclusions 
Ultimately, what we see in the history of information—telegrams and beyond—in Uganda, is a story 
far removed from technological determinism or metropolitan control of information. Instead of being 
dominated by informed British colonialists, Ugandans proved adroit practitioners of buzz, intelligence 
and spin, drawing on older styles of politics that built relationships and networks, and then used those 
to spread rumors. The colonial information network was subject to manipulation not simply by those in 
official positions, but by the Bataka and Cotton Association activists that donated money for 
telegrams, bought pamphlets of Mulumba’s materials and participated in a successful systematic 
effort to disrupt British hegemony. Understanding the system’s norms, in polite communications, and 
its nuances, activists were able to spread rumors, translate them to telegrams, and then analyze them 
as empirical reports in explanatory letters, creating evidence of British perfidy. In doing so, they 
provoked responses that made accusations of British hypocrisy and lawbreaking entirely accurate. 
As British observers on the ground in Uganda noted, Uganda was a prosperous protectorate 
without the extreme exploitation and oppression that characterized neighboring colonies of Rwanda 
and Kenya. With prosperity, savvy, and command of relationships and information, Ugandans’ 
words—slanders, amplifying buzz and targeted spins—allowed activists to simultaneously remake 
Uganda’s people, and the connections between Uganda and Britain. Uganda’s information activists 
defied ideas of metropolitan leadership, building an informational web in which Uganda was central to 
its own interests and realities rather than peripheral within the British empire. 
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